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ACCEPTANCE OF PARTIAL VERDICTS AS A SAFEGUARD
AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY
INTRODUCTION
Consider a criminal jury trial in which the indictment charges a person
with a single homicide.' Homicide encompasses the greater crime of
murder in the first degree and the lesser included offenses of second de-
gree murder and voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.2 Commission
of the greater crime presupposes the simultaneous commission of the
lesser offenses.3 Therefore, if the evidence is sufficient to support a mur-
der conviction, it is also adequate to establish manslaughter.4 Assume
that after ten weeks of trial the judge instructs the jury to consider all the
greater and lesser offenses of homicide.' Additionally, the jury is told to
1. The facts of the following hypothetical are based on Stone v. Superior Court, 31
Cal. 3d 503, 646 P.2d 809, 183 Cal. Rptr. 647 (1982) (en banc).
2. See Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 314 (1896); Gray v. State, 463 P.2d
897, 906 (Alaska 1970); State v. Vickers, 129 Ariz. 506, 512, 633 P.2d 315, 321 (1981) (en
banc); Stone v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 503, 507, 646 P.2d 809, 812, 183 Cal. Rptr.
647, 650 (1982) (en banc); State v. Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608, 610, 566 P.2d 1146, 1148
(1977).
3. See, eg., Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 350 (1965) (lesser included of-
fense is defined within elements of greater offense). Lesser included offenses are defined by
statute in some states. See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 35-41-1-16 (Bums Supp. 1984) (lesser
included offense is established by proof of same material elements required to establish
commission of offense charged); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 1.20(37) (McKinney 1981)
("When it is impossible to commit a particular crime without concomitantly committing,
by the same conduct, another offense of lesser grade or degree, the latter is, with respect
to the former, a 'lesser included offense.' "); Wharton's Criminal Procedure § 375 (C.
Torcia 12th ed. 1975) (if the greater cannot be committed without the lesser, the latter is
necessarily included in the former). Courts use the term lesser included offense inter-
changeably with necessarily included offense, see Olais-Castro v. United States, 416 F.2d
1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1969), but distinctions have been made between the two, see Koenig,
The Many-Headed Hydra of Lesser Included Offenses: A Herculean Task for the Michi-
gan Courts, 1975 Det. C.L. Rev. 41, 41-44 (necessarily included offenses are inevitably
committed with greater;, lesser included offenses are related to the greater, but exist on a
fact-specific basis). For a discussion of the doctrine of lesser included offenses in federal
court, see generally Ettinger, In Search of a Reasoned Approach to the Lesser Included
Offense, 50 Brooklyn L. Rev. 191 (1984).
4. Cf. Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 682 (1977) (per curiam) (conviction for
felony-murder committed in course of robbery precluded subsequent prosecution on rob-
bery charge because all elements of robbery were proved in obtaining felony-murder con-
viction); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977) (prosecutor who has established auto
theft has necessarily established joyriding because every element of joyriding is an ele-
ment of auto theft).
5. In a capital case the trial judge must charge the jury on all lesser included offenses
if the evidence could support a conviction. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638
(1980). Otherwise there is no constitutional right to receive such instructions. See id. at
638 n.14; Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 213 (1973). The accused is entitled to
instruction on the lesser offenses if justified by the evidence, Berra v. United States, 351
U.S. 131, 134 (1956), and most courts require such an instruction, see, e.g., State v. Va-
lencia, 121 Ariz. 191, 198, 589 P.2d 434, 441 (1979) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Santo,
375 Mass. 299, 305-06, 376 N.E.2d 866, 870-71 (1978); People v. Henderson, 41 N.Y.2d
233, 236, 359 N.E.2d 1357, 1360, 391 N.Y.S.2d 563, 566 (1976); see also Note, Subrnis.
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begin deliberations with the greatest crime and, upon unanimous agree-
ment to acquit, to move to the next included offense until a final decision
is reached.6
After a week the foreman reports that the jury is deadlocked:' It is
unable to decide between involuntary manslaughter and not guilty. The
judge declares a mistrial,' but before the jury is discharged the defendant
asks the court to accept a partial verdict9 as to those offenses upon which
the jury has unanimously agreed to acquit-in other words, on all those
greater than involuntary manslaughter. This verdict will protect the de-
fendant from being subject to reprosecution on those offenses. 0 Should
sion of Lesser Crimes, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 888, 893-99 (1956) (discussing the amount of
evidence required to warrant instruction on lesser offenses).
6. This instruction has been approved in most jurisdictions. See, e.g., Nell v. State,
642 P.2d 1361, 1367 (Alaska 1982); State v. Wussler, 139 Ariz. 428, 430, 679 P.2d 74, 76
(1984) (en banc); Stone v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 503, 519, 646 P.2d 809, 820, 183
Cal. Rptr. 647, 658 (1982) (en banc); Lamar v. State, 243 Ga. 401, 402-03, 254 S.E.2d
353, 355, appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 803 (1979); State v. McNeal, 95 Wis. 2d 63, 68-69,
288 N.W.2d 874, 876 (1980); see also E. Devitt & C. Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice &
Instructions § 18.05, at 582 (3d ed. 1977) (if jury unanimously finds accused not guilty of
crime charged in indictment, it must proceed to determine guilt or innocence of lesser
offense necessarily included in the crime). But see People v. West, 408 Mich. 332, 342,
291 N.W.2d 48, 52 (1980) (such instructions are unduly coercive or intrude on jury's
deliberations); State v. Ogden, 35 Or. App. 91, 96-97, 580 P.2d 1049, 1052 (1978) (en
banc) (supplemental instructions interfered with jury deliberations).
7. A deadlock describes a point at which, after a reasonable amount of time deliber-
ating, it is highly improbable that the jury will reach a unanimous decision. This standard
is usually expressed in state statutes. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2140 (1977); Cal.
Penal Code § 1140 (West 1970); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.36(B) (Page 1982); see also
American Bar Ass'n, Standards for Criminal Justice § 15-4.4(c), at 144 (2d ed. 1980)
(deadlock exists if it appears that there is no reasonable probability of jury agreement). It
is estimated that five percent of all juries deadlock. See H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The
American Jury 453 (1966).
It is left to the discretion of the trial judge to declare a mistrial when the jury is dead-
locked. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 510 (1978); Gori v. United States, 367
U.S. 364, 368 (1961). Suggested factors for the trial judge to consider before declaring a
deadlock are length of deliberations, volume and complexity of the case, and statements
of the jury. American Bar Ass'n, Standards Relating to Trial by Jury § 5.4(c) comment at
157 (1968). On appeal great deference is given to the trial judge's decision to declare a
deadlock. See, e-g., Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135, 137 (1909); Logan v. United States,
144 U.S. 263, 298 (1892). Declaring a mistrial is preferable to coercing the jury to reach
a verdict; therefore less scrutiny is given to the decision to discharge a jury. See Arizona
v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 509-10. For a discussion of coercion see infra notes 34-36 and
accompanying text.
8. Declaration of a mistrial is required when a jury is deadlocked. See infra notes 33-
35 and accompanying text.
9. A partial verdict relates only to that portion of the charge on which the jury has
unanimously agreed. For an explanation of how a partial verdict might be received, and
how it can be considered to be a final verdict, see infra notes 45-47 and accompanying
text.
10. A partial verdict will be an acquittal on all offenses greater than those on which
the jury has deadlocked. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. An acquittal is
defined as "a resolution [in defendant's favor], correct or not, of some or all of the factual
elements of the offense charged," United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S.
564, 571 (1977) (emphasis added); see United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 96-97 (1978),
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the trial judge grant the motion? In a majority of state courts, the answer
would be an unequivocal no."' Other states would respond that the fifth
amendment mandates such a verdict. 12
This Note contends that the court must receive a partial verdict of
acquittal on the greater offenses in order to protect the defendant's right
against double jeopardy. Part I outlines this constitutional safeguard.
Part II argues that double jeopardy includes the right to a partial verdict
in cases in which a jury is deadlocked on lesser included offenses. Part
III explores procedural mechanisms for the receipt of partial verdicts.
I. DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROTECTION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
A. Purpose and Scope of the Protection
The fifth amendment to the Constitution protects defendants from be-
ing placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense."3 This protection 14 is
and is an absolute bar to retrial, United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 127, 130
(1980) (it is a settled principle of double jeopardy protection that an acquittal prevents a
retrial); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978) ("law attaches particular signifi-
cance to an acquittal"); Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 571 (barring retrial after an
acquittal is the "most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence");
United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896) (acquittal is an absolute bar to retrial).
Thus, even if it is later established that the acquittal was erroneous, retrial is prohibited.
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141,
143 (1962) (per curiam).
11. See, e.g., Walters v. State, 255 Ark. 904, 906, 503 S.W.2d 895, 897, cert. denied,
419 U.S. 833 (1974); People v. Hall, 25 Ill. App. 3d 992, 995, 324 N.E.2d 50, 52-53
(1975); A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 392 Mass. 52, 56-57, 465 N.E.2d 240, 243 (1984);
People v. Hickey, 103 Mich. App. 350, 353, 303 N.W.2d 19, 21 (1981); State v. Hutter,
145 Neb. 798, 806-07, 18 N.W.2d 203, 209 (1945); State v. Booker, 306 N.C. 302, 305-
06, 293 S.E.2d 78, 80 (1982).
12. See, e.g., Stone v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 503, 519, 646 P.2d 809, 820, 183
Cal. Rptr. 647, 658 (1982) (en banc); State v. Pugliese, 120 N.H. 728, 730, 422 A.2d 1319,
1321 (1980) (per curiam); State v. Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608, 613, 566 P.2d 1146, 1151
(1977).
13. The amendment reads in relevant part: "nor shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy." U.S. Const. amend V. It applies to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969); see
Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 32 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 24 (1978).
Although most states have double jeopardy provisions in their constitutions, see Ameri-
can Law Institute, Administration of the Criminal Law: Double Jeopardy § 6 comment
at 61-65 (1935), this Note will focus on the fifth amendment's application to state crimi-
nal trials.
Offenses are not the same for double jeopardy purposes if conviction requires proof of
different facts. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). Because lesser
included offenses are encompassed within the related greater offenses, conviction on the
greater prevents a reprosecution on the lesser. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168-69
(1977); Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 150-51 (1977); see also In re Neilsen, 131
U.S. 176, 190 (1889) (person tried and convicted of crime which includes various inci-
dents cannot be tried a second time for one of those incidents without being twice put in
jeopardy).
14. There are actually three related protections under the double jeopardy clause:
retrial is prohibited after an acquittal, retrial is prohibited after a conviction, and a de-
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"deeply ingrained"15 in our judicial system and embraces the defendant's
"valued right" to receive a final judgment from the first jury he faces
whenever possible. 6 Double jeopardy prevents the state from subjecting
an individual to the emotional and financial burdens of multiple prosecu-
tions.' 7 Furthermore, unlimited trials increase the likelihood that an in-
nocent person may be convicted. 8 Such an unjust conviction is a greater
affront to our system of justice than acquittal of the guilty. 19
fendant cannot be twice punished for the same offense. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
15. This phrase comes from a frequently quoted passage concerning double jeopardy:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-Ameri-
can system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal
and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as
well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found
guilty.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). It is cited in many double jeopardy
cases. See, e.g., Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35 (1978); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S.
377, 387-88 (1975); United States v. Jom, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion).
For a history of the Court's view of double jeopardy protection see United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 126-31 (1980); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503-14
(1978); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 199-211 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
16. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949); see Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458,
471 (1973) (defendant has a "weighty" interest in having his "fate determined by the jury
first impaneled"); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486 (1971) (plurality opinion)
(defendant has a right to have his case completed by first trial "once and for all"); United
States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896) (prohibition is not exclusively against being twice
punished; thus whether convicted or acquitted, defendant is equally put in jeopardy at
first trial).
17. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957); see Oregon v. Kennedy, 456
U.S. 667, 676-77 (1982) (double jeopardy frees defendant from "extended anxiety"
caused by trials); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661 (1977) (double jeopardy
prevents defendants from "endur[ing] the personal strain, public embarrassment, and ex-
pense of a criminal trial more than once"); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736
(1963) (double jeopardy protects defendant from harassment of successive prosecutions);
Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 171 (1873) (purpose of double jeopardy is to
prevent state trials from being oppressive; therefore, to preserve the liberty of the defend-
ant, only one conviction or acquittal is allowed) (quoting Commonwealth v. Olds, 11 Ky.
(5 Litt.) 137 (1823)); cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (jury trials pre-
vent government oppression and overzealous prosecution).
18. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957); see Gori v. United States, 367
U.S. 364, 369 (1961) (double jeopardy safeguard prevents prosecution from obtaining a
"more favorable opportunity to convict the accused"); United States v. Richardson, 702
F.2d 1079, 1085 & n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (discussing probability of unjust convictions
after repeated prosecutions), rev'd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 3081 (1984); Findlater,
RetrialAfter a Hung Jury: The Double Jeopardy Problem, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 701, 713
(1981) (risk of innocent person being convicted increases on retrial because as the re-
sources of defendant diminish it becomes more difficult to present an adequate defense);
Note, Twice In Jeopardy, 75 Yale L.J. 262, 278 n.74 (1965) (statistical calculation of the
possibility of unjust conviction on retrial) [hereinafter cited as Twice In Jeopardy].
19. M. Saks, Jury Verdicts 69 (1977); Douglas, Foreward to J. Frank & B. Frank, Not
Guilty 11 (1957) ("we believe that it is better for ten guilty people to be set free than for
one innocent man to be unjustly imprisoned"). See generally J. Frank & B. Frank, supra
(compilation of unjust conviction cases).
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Thus, underlying the double jeopardy provision is the premise that the
state has "one, and only one" opportunity to present all of its evidence
against the defendant.20 Any other rule would give the prosecutor who
failed to convict in the first instance additional time to use the vast re-
sources of the state to gather new evidence.2" Moreover, a retrial would
be conducted with the invaluable experience of a "dress rehearsal".'
Witnesses would be better able to convey their stories, and arguments
that appeared weak at the first trial could be strengthened.'
The defendant's right to be free from a second trial attaches when the
first jury is sworn and impaneled.24 Retrial is barred if that jury is dis-
charged without the defendant's consent" before a final verdict unless
there is showing of "manifest necessity." 26
20. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978). See supra note 18.
21. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978); Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). While the defendant also has additional time, he does not have
the same advantage because of his limited access to resources. See Findlater, supra note
18, at 713; Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari. New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 32 (1960).
22. State v. Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608, 612, 566 P.2d 1146, 1150 (1977); see Tibbs v.
Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128 (1980);
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 105 n.4 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Arizona v.
Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 508 n.24 (1978); Findlater, supra note 18, at 713; Twice in
Jeopardy, supra note 18, at 287-88.
23. See Findlater, supra note 18, at 713 ("witnesses may be encouraged to do further
soul-searching or [the prosecutor may coach] until recollection accords with [his] goals");
Schulhofer, Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 449, 504-06 (1977) (prosecution
obtains two advantages from retrial: any tactical problem in the first trial may be reme-
died in the second and on retrial prosecution has more insight into defense strategy);
Comment, Double Jeopardy and Reprosecution After Mistriak Is the Manifest Necessity
Test Manifestly Necessary?, 69 Nw. U.L. Rev. 887, 907 (1975) (repeated attempts at pros-
ecution permit "unnecessary expense and [condone] incompetence" because the prosecu-
tor knows he will have another chance to refine his case) [hereinafter cited as Manifest
Necessity].
24. See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737-38 (1963). In a nonjury trial,
double jeopardy attaches when the evidence is first introduced. Serfass v. United States,
420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975). This was made part of the constitutional protection by the
Supreme Court in Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 32-33 (1978). The defendant has an inter-
est in retaining the first jury because it may be more favorably disposed to his case. See,
e.g., id. at 35; Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 474-75 (1973) (White, J., dissenting)
(citing United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 (1971) (plurality opinion)); United States
v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486 (1971) (plurality opinion); see also Schulhofer, supra note 23,
at 512-14 (defendant's interest in retaining the more favorable jury would be better served
by a rule that made double jeopardy attach at the opening of voir dire). But see Crist v.
Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 51 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting) (double jeopardy does protect de-
fendant's interest in a more favorable factfinder).
25. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 96 (1978); People v. Strauss, 48 Misc. 2d
1006, 1007, 266 N.Y.S.2d 431, 433 (Crim. Ct. 1965); State v. Deas, 25 N.C. App. 294,
297, 212 S.E.2d 693, 695, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 467, 215 S.E.2d 626 (1975); see also
Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 (1982) (no consent will be found when defendant's
motion for mistrial is provoked by intentional prosecutorial or judicial misconduct);
United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607-10 (1976) (same); United States v. Tateo, 377
U.S. 463, 466-67 (1964) (same).
26. See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the manifest ne-
cessity test.
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B. The Manifest Necessity Test
A trial court may discharge a jury over defendant's objections when-
ever "taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest
necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be
defeated."27 Double jeopardy will not bar a second trial when this mani-
fest necessity test is met.28
Exceptions to double jeopardy ensure that defendants will not be freed
because of intervening events over which the court has no control. 29 For
example, when an advancing army threatened the trial, discharge of the
jury prior to its reaching a verdict did not prevent a retrial.30 Under such
circumstances, double jeopardy concerns are outweighed by the public
interest in final judgments that resolve the issues and thus assure that the
accused is brought to justice.31 At the same time, the defendant has the
right to have his innocence proclaimed so that charges are not outstand-
ing against him. 3
2
27. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
28. Id. at 579. Manifest necessity is met under a variety of circumstances. See, e.g.,
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 510-11 (1978) (prejudicial statements of defense
counsel in opening argument); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1973) (indict.
ment incurably defective); Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271, 273-74 (1894) (juror
member of the grand jury that indicted defendant); Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S.
148, 154 (1891) (juror acquainted with defendant but denied it on voir dire).
For a discussion of the various ways in which the manifest necessity test has been
interpreted, including its ambiguities and application, see Findlater, supra note 18, at
702-10; Schulhofer, supra note 23, at 490-93; Manifest Necessity, supra note 23, at 891-
904.
29. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949).
30. See id. at 691-92.
31. Id. at 689; see Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978) (a primary purpose of double
jeopardy clause is to preserve "finality" of judgments); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S.
497, 503 (1978) (public interest in finality is so strong that an acquitted defendant cannot
be retried even if acquittal was an egregious error) (citing Fong Foo v. United States, 369
U.S. 141, 143 (1962)); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975) (freely granting
retrials "disserve[s] the defendant's legitimate interest in the finality of a verdict"); Illi-
nois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 463 (1973) (public interest in finality prohibits applica-
tion of "rigid rules" that would prevent reaching a verdict). Without the concept of
finality the government could continue to prosecute until it obtained a conviction. See
Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 18, at 267. Other reasons for avoiding retrial are discussed
supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
The Court has also suggested the need to balance the interests of defendant and state.
See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 100 & n.13 (1978); Arizona v. Washington,
434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471 (1973); Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957); Findlater, supra note 18, at 712-18. But see
Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 37 n.16 (1978) (suggests that such balancing not always re-
quired); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 n.6 (1978) (same).
32. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503-04 (1978) (second prosecution
"prolongs the period in which [defendant] is stigmatized by an unresolved accusation of
wrongdoing"); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957) (retrials embarrass
defendant and compel "him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity"); cf
Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 21, at 31 (finality in civil cases allows litigant to plan his
financial future without risk of paying an outstanding judgment). Similarly, criminal de-
fendants should be able to plan their lives without the constant fear of punishment. Cf
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A hung jury remains the "prototypical example" of manifest necessity
justifying the declaration of a mistrial.33 If a deadlock prevented retrials,
the judge might pressure the jury to reach a conclusion.34 Jurors might
exert similar pressure on their peers who are causing the deadlock.35
Such a coerced verdict is antithetical to the concept of a fair trial, which
is based on the notion that convictions should be the product of reasoned
deliberation and not of "starv[ing the jury] into a verdict." 36
II. ACCEPTANCE OF A PARTIAL VERDICT AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO
DECLARING A MISTRIAL
Under the manifest necessity test it is within the trial judge's discretion
to abort a trial before a final judgment is reached.3 7 This authority, how-
ever, "ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circum-
stances, and for very plain and obvious causes. ' 3'  Nevertheless, many
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 373 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criminal convic-
tions impose stigma and cause damage to the reputation of the accused).
33. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982); see Richardson v. United States,
104 S. CL 3081, 3085 (1984) ("established for 160 years ... that a failure ... to agree
on a verdict was an instance of 'manifest necessity' "). Since Perez v. United States, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824), the Supreme Court has decided only a handful of cases that
directly involved a deadlocked jury. See, eg., Keen v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135, 137-38
(1909); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 85-86 (1902); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S.
263, 297-98 (1892). In dictum, however, the Court consistently mentions the hung jury
as a settled exception to double jeopardy. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509
(1978); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 463 (1973).
34. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509-10 (1978); see also Brasfield v.
United States, 272 U.S. 448, 449-50 (1926) (coercive for judge to inquire into numerical
division of hung jury in middle of deliberations); United States v. Edwards, 469 F.2d
1362, 1367 (5th Cir. 1972) (coercive to force doubtful juror to state his or her verdict in
presence of court).
Judicial pressure is difficult to measure. The seminal case on the limitation of the
judge's charge to ajury is Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). See infra note 37.
Additional instructions given to a jury are referred to as an "Allen charge" and are the
subject of much criticism and comment. An analysis of the appropriateness of an Allen
charge is beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion of the various criticisms see
American Bar Ass'n, supra note 6, § 5.4(b) comment at 149-56.
35. In Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), the judge warned the jurors to
base their decision on independent reasoning and not to "acquiesc[e] in the conclusion of
[their] fellows." Id. at 501. A hung jury is actually considered to be an indication of
independent reasoning by the jury. See H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, supra note 7, at 453.
36. State v. M'Kee, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 651, 653 (1830); see Arizona v. Washington,
434 U.S. 497, 510 & n.27 (1978) (coercion frustrates the public interest in just judg-
ments); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977) (interfer-
ence with independence of the jury is prohibited); Findlater, supra note 18, at 711-12
nn.42-43 (forcing a deadlocked jury to conclude is coercive).
37. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824); see Gori v. United
States, 367 U.S. 364, 368 (1961) (trial judge is "best situated intelligently to make such a
decision"); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949) (trial judge is far more "conversant
with factors relevant to the determination [of whether to declare a mistrial]").
38. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824); see Arizona v. Wash-
ington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978) ("manifest necessity cannot be applied mechanically";
attention to the particular problem confronting the court is required); United States v.
Join, 400 U.S. 470, 486 (1971) (plurality opinion) ("judge must always temper the deci-
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judges ignore the unique situation presented by a jury deadlocked on
lesser offenses, and mechanically disregard the defendant's request for a
partial verdict.39
Manifest necessity requires courts to consider and employ any proce-
dures that would prevent the first trial from becoming a nullity.40 The
jury instructed on lesser included offenses can, at the end of its delibera-
tions on all of the charges, simply state in open court those charges on
which they have unanimously agreed to acquit the defendant.4 The
court can then enter a partial verdict of not guilty as to these offenses42
and double jeopardy will bar only their retrial.43 If a partial verdict is
not accepted, the defendant faces reprosecution for crimes of which he
has already been acquitted. This directly contravenes the fifth amend-
ment's mandate that the government have "one, and only one" opportu-
nity to prove its case.44
A partial verdict on the greater offenses also satisfies the judicial stan-
dard for finality of judgments.45 A final verdict must be received and
recorded in open court at the end of the jury's deliberations.4" A partial
sion [to declare a mistrial]" by considering the defendant's right to "conclude his con-
frontation with society").
39. See, e.g., Walters v. State, 255 Ark. 904, 905-06, 503 S.W.2d 895, 896-97, cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974) (defendant's request to receive a partial verdict dismissed in
two page opinon based solely on manifest necessity because of hung jury); People v.
Hickey, 103 Mich. App. 350, 353, 303 N.W.2d 19, 21 (1981) (defendant's request denied
based on California case of People v. Griffin, 66 Cal. 2d 459, 464, 426 P.2d 507, 510, 58
Cal. Rptr. 107, 110 (1967) (en banc), which did not even address the issue); State v.
Booker, 306 N.C. 302, 305-06, 293 S.E.2d 78, 80-81 (1982) (addressing the issue by quot-
ing the entire discussion in Hickey).
40. See, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 526-27 (1978) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (no manifest necessity to declare mistrial because trial judge did not explore
alternatives); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971) (plurality opinion) (because
alternative of interrupting trial was available, manifest necessity not met when judge de-
clared mistrial); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737-38 (1963) (manifest neces-
sity not met when witness essential to two of six counts unavailable); State v. Pugliese,
120 N.H. 728, 730, 422 A.2d 1319, 1321 (1980) (per curiam) (partial verdict required as
alternative to declaring mistrial when jury deadlocks on lesser included offenses but
agrees on greater offense); State v. Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608, 611, 566 P.2d 1146, 1149
(1977) (same); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 644 (1980) ("invoking the mis-
trial option in a case in which the jury agrees that the defendant is guilty of some offense
: * .would require the jurors to violate their oaths to acquit in a proper case") (emphasis
in original).
41. See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of how a partial
verdict can be a final verdict.
42. See Stone v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 503, 514, 646 P.2d 809, 816, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 647, 654 (1982); State v. Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608, 613, 566 P.2d 1146, 1151 (1977).
43. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978) ("If the innocence of the
accused has been confirmed. . . the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second
trial [is] unfair"). See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
44. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
46. This is true in most jurisdictions. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(a); Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 546.390 (1959); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-9-21 (1982); Colo. R. Crim. P. 31(a); Mass.
R. Crim. P. 31(a); N.M. R. Crim. P. 44(a); Unif. R. Crim. P. 535(a), (b).
In addition, many states require a general verdict on the entire charge and do not allow
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verdict can easily meet these requirements.47 Thus such verdicts preserve
the public's interest in final judgments and the defendant's constitutional
rights. In addition, limiting the scope of retrial frees courts from the bur-
densome task of rehearing the same case against the defendant.4"
III. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Trial Procedure
Standard criminal procedure allows a jury charged on multiple crimes,
such as robbery and kidnapping, to return a verdict as to any offenses
upon which they have agreed at any time during their deliberations.49
Receipt of such a verdict neither ends these deliberations nor precludes a
retrial on any offenses upon which the jury was unable to agree; it is
merely a partial verdict on the charge.5" However, a jury considering a
single charge with lesser included offenses is generally not permitted to
a special verdict on specific facts or issues. See, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. § 46-16-603(1)
(1983); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.07(1)(a) (Vernon 1981); Mass. R. Crim. P. 27(a).
At least one court interpreted this rule as preventing the receipt of a partial verdict on the
greater offense. See A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 392 Mass. 52, 56-57, 465 N.E.2d 240,
243 (1984).
The Supreme Court has approved implied verdicts, if the jury's intent is clear. See
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191 (1957); see also Carver v. Martin, 664 F.2d 932,
935 (4th Cir. 1981) ("verdict is sufficient if the jury's intention can be ascertained with
reasonable certainty from the language used in the verdict") (quoting People v. Tan-
nahill, 38 Ill. App. 3d 767, 773, 348 N.E.2d 847, 852 (1976)); Stone v. Superior Court, 31
Cal. 3d 503, 511, 646 P.2d 809, 814-15, 183 Cal. Rptr. 647, 652-53 (1982) (en bane)
(verdict need only represent the intent of the jury). But see People v. Hall, 25 IU. App. 3d
992, 994, 324 N.E.2d 50, 52 (1975) (only way to recognize a verdict is by formal return
by jury to court). In State v. Hutter, 145 Neb. 798, 18 N.W.2d 203 (1945), the court held
that no verdict can be considered a prior conviction or acquittal until there has been a
final determination on the entire count charged. Id. at 804-05, 18 N.W.2d at 208. There
are two problems with relying on the holding in Hutter to justify denying the defendant's
request for a partial verdict. First, the holding is based on common law definitions of
homicide that distinguish degrees of that crime only for the purpose of punishment. See
id. at 802-04, 18 N.W.2d at 207-08. Second, in Hutter the jury was deadlocked on man-
slaughter;, the defendant wanted to give weight to the trial judge's decision to withdraw
the charges of first and second degree murder from the jury's consideration. The court
held that the judge's action could not amount to an acquittal. See id. at 805, 18 N.W.2d
at 208. This is markedly different from recognizing an implied acquittal when a jury has
considered all of the greater and lesser offenses and has deadlocked only on the lesser
crimes. See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
47. See Stone v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 503, 517-18, 646 P.2d 809, 819, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 647, 657 (1982) (en banc); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 310.70(l)(a) (McKinney 1982);
N.M. R. Crim. P. 44(d).
48. See Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 18, at 277.
49. See, eg., Selvester v. United States, 170 U.S. 262, 269-70 (1898); United States v.
Varkonyi, 611 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945 (1980); Cal. Penal Code
§ 1160 (West 1970); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 310.70(1) (McKinney 1982); 3 C. Wright
Federal Practice and Procedure § 513 (2d ed. 1982).
50. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 310.70 (1)(b)Ci) (McKinney 1982). Receipt of a ver-
dict on separate offenses is also a "partial verdict." See supra note 49 and accompanying
text.
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return any verdict when it deadlocks."'
Lesser offenses can be treated procedurally in the same manner as mul-
tiple offenses. Acceptance of a partial verdict of acquittal on murder in
the first degree when the jury deadlocks on the second degree charge is
indistinguishable from receiving a verdict of not guilty on robbery when
the jury cannot agree on the accompanying kidnapping charge. 2 The
oft-quoted rationale for accepting the latter verdict yet rejecting the for-
mer is that "the weight of final adjudication should not be given to any
jury action that is not returned in a final verdict."53 This argument is
unsupported because, as has been demonstrated, the partial verdict meets
the requirements of a final verdict.54
The contention that a partial verdict would be coercive because it re-
quires an "unwarranted and unwise intrusion into the province of the
jury" 55 is equally unsupported by the facts surrounding the receipt of a
partial verdict. Coercion is only a concern when the jury is still consider-
ing its verdict.5 6 A deadlocked jury has completed its deliberations; in-
quiry into whether a partial verdict has been reached will therefore not
be intrusive.57
Alternative procedures for receipt of a partial verdict include: giving
verdict forms to the jury for each included offense and instructing them
51. See, e.g., Walters v. State, 255 Ark. 904, 906, 503 S.W.2d 895, 897, cert. denied,
419 U.S. 833 (1974); People v. Hall, 25 Il. App. 3d 992, 993-94, 324 N.E.2d 50, 51-52
(1975); A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 392 Mass. 52, 56-57, 465 N.E.2d 240, 243-44
(1984). Instead of accepting partial verdicts, these courts discharged the juries on the
basis of manifest necessity. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
52. See Stone v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 503, 517-18, 646 P.2d 809, 819, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 647, 657 (1982) (en banc).
53. A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 392 Mass. 52, 56, 465 N.E.2d 240, 244 (1984)
(quoting People v. Hickey, 103 Mich. App. 350, 353, 303 N.W.2d 19, 21 (1981)); State v.
Booker, 306 N.C. 302, 306, 293 S.E.2d 78, 81 (1982) (same). These cases and the case of
People v. Hall, 25 Ill. App. 3d 992, 994, 324 N.E.2d 50, 52 (1975), rely in part on People
v. Griffin, 66 Cal. 2d 459, 426 P.2d 507, 58 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1967) (en banc), which held
that a verdict of a deadlocked jury is not final because it represents a compromise, see Id.
at 464, 426 P.2d at 510, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 110. Reliance on Griffin is misplaced because
"[t]he primary concern of the Griffin court was to insure that a verdict represents the
definite and final expression of the jury's intent." Stone v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 503,
514, 646 P.2d 809, 816, 183 Cal. Rptr. 647, 654 (1982) (en banc). The Griffin court was
asked to challenge the verdict after the jury had been discharged. Id. at 514, 646 P.2d at
816, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 654. Moreover, the Stone court subsequently approved of accepting
a verdict from a deadlocked jury charged on lesser included offenses. See id. at 519-20,
646 P.2d at 820, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 658.
54. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
55. People v. Hickey, 103 Mich. App. 350, 353, 303 N.W.2d 19, 21 (1981); see A
Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 392 Mass. 52, 56, 465 N.E.2d 240, 244 (1984) (citing Hickey,
103 Mich. App. at 353, 303 N.W.2d at 21); State v. Booker, 306 N.C. 302, 306, 293
S.E.2d 78, 81 (1982) (same).
56. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. See State v. Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608,
612, 566 P.2d 1146, 1150 (1977) (inquiring into jury's vote on included offenses does not
violate the policy of discouraging intrusion into the jury).
57. See State v. Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608, 612, 566 P.2d 1146, 1150 (1977).
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to return a verdict of guilty or not guilty for each offense;"8 or leaving the
jury to their deliberations, and in the event of a deadlock polling the jury
to determine if there is unanimous intent to acquit the defendant on any
of the charges.59
Courts currently employ both alternatives.' Submitting individual
forms for each offense assures the court that a jury's decision is based
upon full knowledge of its options,6" but this procedure may be perceived
as coercive because it suggests that the jury compromise for the sake of
reaching a conclusion. 2 However, a jury unaware of its alternatives
might return an unwarranted conviction on the greater crime if the op-
tion to convict on the lesser offense is not apparent. 3 Thus, providing the
jury with forms for all offenses is a procedural safeguard against unjust
convictions."
Independent decisionmaking is also crucial to the deliberation pro-
ess.65 Polling the jury after they have been given forms for all of the
charges and reached a genuine impasse thus provides additional assur-
ance against a coerced verdict. 6 When a jury deadlocks on the lesser
offenses, yet agrees to a final verdict on the greater, the judge can simply
apply the same procedures used to poll a jury when a final verdict is
reached on the entire charge.67
58. See Stone v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 503, 519, 646 P.2d 809, 820, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 647, 658 (1982) (en banc); State v. Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608, 611, 566 P.2d 1146, 1149
(1977); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 310.70 (McKinney 1982).
59. See Stone v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 503, 520, 646 P.2d 809, 820, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 647, 658 (1982); State v. Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608, 611, 566 P.2d 1146, 1149 (1977);
N.M. R. Crim. P. 44(d).
60. See supra notes 59-60.
61. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980).
62. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 372 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting). But
see Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 22 (1980) (jury is permitted to acquit out of
compassion or compromise); Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393-94 (1932) (ver-
dicts resulting from compromise will not be overturned); United States v. Campbell, 684
F.2d 141, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (compromise verdicts are not unacceptable); cf. Ham-
ling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 101 (1974) (that different juries reach different results
is a consequence of our system).
63. See People v. Hall, 25 Ill. App. 3d 992, 995, 324 N.E.2d 50, 52 (1975).
64. Cf Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980) (lesser included offense instruction
is a procedural safeguard).
65. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977).
66. Such a rule would combine the procedures now used by courts in New York and
New Mexico, see N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 310.70 (McKinney 1982); N.M. P. Crim. P.
44(d), and suggested as alternatives by California, see Stone v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d
503, 519-20, 646 P.2d 809, 820, 183 Cal. Rptr. 647, 658 (1982).
67. Polling enables the court and the parties "to ascertain for a certainty that each of
the jurors approves of the verdict as returned." Humphries v. District of Columbia, 174
U.S. 190, 194 (1899). In most states the parties have a right to poll the jury. See, e.g.,
Ruffin v. State, 123 A.2d 461, 467 (Del. 1956); Shouse v. State, 231 Ga. 716, 717, 203
S.E.2d 537, 539 (1974). In some states, however, polling is at the discretion of the court.
See, e.g, Commonwealth v. Valliere, 366 Mass. 479, 497, 321 N.E2d 625, 637 (1974);
Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 619 (1956). There is no rule as to the form of questioning when
polling. See White v. Seaboard Coast Line R-R., 139 Ga. App. 829, 833, 229 S.E.2d 775,
777-78 (1976). For polling in federal court, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(d). Polling before the
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B. Post-Trial Procedure
If the court does not apply one of the procedures outlined above, an
appellate or second trial court must infer acquittal on the greater of-
fense. 8 Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues that have been
decided in a final and valid judgment between the same parties.69 Appli-
cation of this doctrine requires the ability to ascertain exactly what the
first jury decided.7" If it is clear from the trial record that the jury dead-
locked on the lesser offenses7 1 and a partial verdict on the greater crime
is not inferred by the second court, the defendant is forced to relitigate
issues already finalized by the first jury.
An implicit acquittal on a greater offense is a widely employed proce-
dure which the Supreme Court made part of double jeopardy in Green v.
United States.72 The Court held that when a defendant has been put
jury reaches a verdict is generally not permitted. See, e.g., Favors v. State, 234 Ga. 80,
88-89, 214 S.E.2d 645, 652 (1975); People v. Hanna, 2 Ill. App. 3d 672, 674, 276 N.E.2d
796, 798 (1971); Commonwealth v. Pacini, 224 Pa. Super. 497, 500, 307 A.2d 346, 348
(1973). The jury charged with lesser included offenses can reach a verdict as to some of
the charges, see supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text, so that the rule against pre-
verdict polling will not be violated. The federal courts do not require a partial verdict on
greater offenses when the jury deadlocks on lesser included offenses. See Winston v.
Moore, 452 U.S. 944, 946-47 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari);
United States v. Medansky, 486 F.2d 807, 813 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989
(1974).
68. Stone v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 503, 519-20, 646 P.2d 809, 820, 183 Cal. Rptr.
647, 658 (1982); State v. Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608, 611-12, 566 P.2d 1146, 1149-50 (1977).
By accepting a partial verdict the court does not challenge the longstanding rule that a
jury's verdict cannot be impeached by an affidavit produced after its valid return. See
People v. Hall, 25 Ill. App. 3d 992, 994, 324 N.E.2d 50, 52 (1975); A Juvenile v. Com-
monwealth, 392 Mass. 52, 57, 465 N.E.2d 240, 244 (1984). Implying a partial verdict is
only appropriate when the trial record establishes the clear intent of the jury. See infra
note 72.
69. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982). The doctrine requires that
"[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final
judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is con-
clusive in a subsequent action between the same parties, whether on the same or a differ-
ent claim." Id. Collateral estoppel was made part of double jeopardy protection by Ashe
v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970). For a history of the doctrine in criminal law, see
Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 22, at 29-41; cf IB J. Moore, J. Lucas & T. Currier,
Moore's Federal Practice 11 -.441-.448 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing collateral estoppel in
civil context); Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1942) (same).
70. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 472 (1958). If the record is unclear regarding
where the jury deadlocked, the greatest protection defendant could receive is to be retried
only on the least included offense. See State v. Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608, 613-14, 566 P.2d
1146, 1151-52 (1977). But a partial verdict should not be implied unless the record un-
equivocally states the intent of the jury to acquit on that offense. See infra note 72.
71. See, eg., Stone v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 503, 514, 646 P.2d 809, 816-17, 183
Cal. Rptr. 647, 654-55 (1982). But see Walters v. State, 255 Ark. 904, 906-07, 503
S.W.2d 895, 897 (trial record clear that jury deadlocked between involuntary manslaugh-
ter and not guilty but it did not justify an implicit acquittal on any of the greater of-
fenses), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974); State v. Booker, 306 N.C. 302, 304, 293 S.E.2d
78, 79 (1982) (note from foreman indicating that jury was deadlocked at second degree
murder did not warrant implicit acquittal on the first degree murder charge).
72. See 355 U.S. 184, 190-91 (1957).
[Vol. 53
PARTIAL VERDICTS
through the ordeal of a trial, conviction on the lesser offense when the
jury expressed no judgment as to the greater is indistinguishable from an
acquittal on the greater crime.73 Similarly, because the jury has been in-
structed to consider lesser included offenses only after acquitting on the
greater crimes, a deadlock on the former is equivalent to an acquittal on
the latter.74 A second prosecution on the greater charge is thus necessar-
ily barred.75 Of course the defendant may be reprosecuted on the lesser
offenses in accordance with the "manifest necessity" standard.76 The
public interest in finality, judicial economy and fairness is served by the
implication of a final verdict on the greater offenses and retrial on the
lesser.77
Furthermore, by failing to give weight to the first jury's implicit ac-
quittal, courts are promulgating an unfair standard of double jeopardy
protection. Green protects defendants convicted of lesser offenses against
retrial on the greater offenses, 78 but the person whose case raises serious
doubts in the jurors' minds with respect to the lesser offenses risks rep-
rosecution on the greater. 9
CONCLUSION
The double jeopardy protection granted individuals by the fifth
amendment requires that charges against an individual be resolved,
whenever possible, at the first trial. When the jury reaches a unanimous
decision of acquittal on a greater crime but deadlocks on a lesser offense,
failure to receive a partial verdict on the greater crime violates the de-
fendant's double jeopardy protection by allowing the state to reprosecute
him for an offense of which he has been acquitted.
Mary S. O'Keefe
73. See id.
74. In Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), the Court refused to allow the
defendant's right to turn on procedural distinctions. The fact that he was charged with
murder in one count did not prevent the jury from returning a verdict on the lesser
charge and implying a verdict on the greater. Id. at 190 n.10; see Stone v. Superior
Court, 31 Cal. 3d 503, 518, 646 P.2d 809, 819, 183 Cal. Rptr. 647, 657 (1982) (citing
Green, 355 U.S. at 190 n.10).
75. See supra note 10 and accompanying text for a discussion of acquittal as an abso-
lute bar to retrial.
76. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the manifest
necessity standard.
77. See State v. Castrillo, 90 N.M. 608, 612, 566 P.2d 1146, 1150 (1977). See supra
note 31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the public's interest in finality.
78. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190-91 (1957). See supra notes 72-73 and
accompanying text.
79. See supra note 11 for cases holding that the defendant can be retried on a charge
on which he was effectively acquitted in a previous trial.
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